Contemporary debates in cognitive science / edited by Robert J. Stainton.
Τύπος υλικού:
ΚείμενοΣειρά: Contemporary debates in philosophyΛεπτομέρειες δημοσίευσης: Malden, MA ; Oxford : Blackwell Pub., 2006.Περιγραφή: xiv, 339 σ. : σχήμ. ; 26 εκISBN: - 1405113049
- 9781405113045
- 1405113057
- 9781405113052
- 153 23
| Τύπος τεκμηρίου | Τρέχουσα βιβλιοθήκη | Ταξιθετικός αριθμός | Αριθμός αντιτύπου | Κατάσταση | Ημερομηνία λήξης | Ραβδοκώδικας |
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![Book [21]](https://library.upatras.gr/nereus/nereus-book-yes.png "Book [21]")
Book [21]
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Φιλοσοφίας | 153 CON (Περιήγηση στο ράφι(Άνοιγμα παρακάτω)) | 1 | Διαθέσιμο | 025000170528 |
Περιλαμβάνει βιβλιογραφία και ευρετήριο.
Acknowledgments -- Notes on contributors -- Preface -- [pt. 1]. Just how modular is the mind? -- 1. The case for massively modular models of mind / Peter Carruthers -- 2. Is the mind really modular? / Jesse J. Prinz -- 3. Is the human mind massively modular? / Richard Samuels -- [pt. 2]. How much knowledge of language is innate? -- 4. Irrational nativist exuberance / Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K. Pullum -- 5. The case for linguistic nativism / Robert J. Matthews -- 6. On the innateness of language / James McGilvray -- [pt. 3]. Has cognitive science shown that human beings are cognitively bounded, or irrational? -- 7. Bounded and rational / Gerd Gigerenzer -- 8. Bounded rationality and the enlightenment picture of cognitive virtue / David Matheson.
[pt. 4]. Are rules and representations necessary to explain systematicity? -- 9. Cognition needs syntax but not rules / Terence Horgan and John Tienson -- 10. Phenomena and mechanisms : putting the symbolic, connectionist, and dynamical systems debate in broader perspective / Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel -- [pt. 5]. Can consciousness and qualia be reduced? -- 11. Consciousness and qualia can be reduced / William G. Lycan -- 12. Consciousness and qualia cannot be reduced / Brie Gertler -- [pt. 6]. Does cognitive science need external content at all? -- 13. Locating meaning in the mind (where it belongs) / Ray Jackendoff -- 14. The intentional inexistence of language -- but not cars / Georges Rey -- [pt. 7]. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? -- 15. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? / Kirk Ludwig -- 16. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations? A case for the "No" side / Christopher Viger -- [pt. 8]. Can mental states, knowledge in particular, be divided into a narrow component and a broad component? -- 17. Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components? / Timothy Williamson -- 18. The internal and external components of cognition / Ralph Wedgwood -- Index.
